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The paper fully characterizes the Bertrand equilibria of oligopolistic markets
where consumers may ignore the last (i.e., the right-most) digits of prices.
Consumers, in this model, do not do this reflexively or out of irrationality, but
only when they expect the time cost of acquiring full cognizance of the exact
price to exceed the expected loss caused by the slightly erroneous amounts that
are likely to be purchased or the slightly higher price that may be paid by virtue
of ignoring the information concerning the last digits of prices. It is shown
that in this setting there will always exist firms that set prices that end in nine
though there may also be some (nonstrict) equilibria where a non-nine price
ending occurs. It is shown that all firms earn positive profits even in Bertrand
equilibria. The model helps us understand in what kinds of markets we are most
likely to encounter pricing in the nines.
1. Introduction
A large body of research has confirmed what shoppers the world over
know, namely, that a disproportionately large number of goods are
priced to end in a nine. Hamburgers for 99 cents; shoes for £49; and so
on. There is also a substantial literature that analyzes this phenomenon
of “pricing in nines”,1 which is closely related to what is referred to
in the marketing literature as the phenomenon of “odd pricing” (e.g.,
Evans and Berman, 1997, p. 626). Clearly, this kind of pricing is evidence
of consumer carelessness in processing the less important (i.e., the right-
most) digits of a price. However, while the standard presumption is that
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the consumer treats the last digits as if they were zero,2 it will be assumed
here that consumers act rationally and are either fully cognizant of all
digits or assume the last digits to be whatever they are, on average,
in reality. And which of these two behaviors they choose itself has a
meta-rational basis. Interestingly, in this area of consumer choice, meta-
rationality and irrationality look (at least on the face of it) behaviorally
similar.
There is a substantial literature that has speculated about the
widespread prevalence of nine as the right-most digit in prices. That
this actually helps sell larger quantities has also been demonstrated
through controlled randomized experiments. Anderson and Simester
(2003), for instance, persuaded a national mail-order company that sells
women’s clothing to send out different versions of a catalog to separate,
randomly selected customer samples, where the same products had 9
price endings in some catalogues and non-9 price endings in others.
They found that when sold at the higher price that ended in 9 (in one
example, selling the same product for $49 instead of $45) this raised
demand by as much as 40%.3 The question is: why does this happen?
A variety of explanations are available. It is, for instance, possible that
some mental units are easily “available” or “accessible” to the mind
and round numbers are salient among them (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Fazio et al., 1982; Thaler, 1985). So when we see a price like $49
we immediately perceive this as actually $50 (the nearest round number)
with a discount (Schindler and Kirby, 1997) and feel tempted to pick up
the “bargain.”
This perception that a product being sold for a price ending in nines
is somehow on sale has been widely noted (see, for example, Anderson
and Simester, 2003; Inman et al., 1990). This can be a matter of illusion
or irrationality on the part of the consumer. But, and more surprisingly,
this can also be a rational response of using a rule of thumb, given
that our brain capacity is limited and given that some firms do actually
use 9-price-endings for products on sale. J. Crew and Ralph Lauren, for
instance, often use 00-cent endings on regularly priced merchandise and
99-cent endings on discounted items (Anderson and Simester, 2003a).
The aim of the present paper is to explain the widespread phe-
nomenon of 9-price ending, while maintaining the assumption of con-
sumer rationality as far as possible. First, I shall assume that when
2. See Gabor and Granger (1964), Wilkie (1990), Schindler and Kibarian (1996), Nagle
and Holden (1995).
3. For a mail order company selling lots of goods, raising the price of one good from
$45–49 does not necessarily mean a rise in profit, even though the demand for the product
rises. The authors do not investigate this, but it is possible that this increased demand is
offset by a decline in demand for other goods in the catalogue.
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consumers decide to use only partial information in making their
decisions, for instance, ignoring information about the last digits of
a price, they do so because it is rational to do so. The processing of
information is costly for the brain and so in certain situations it is rational
to economize on the use of information. Second, when we recognize that
consumers do often ignore the last digits of a price, we shall not assume
that they assume this to be zero.
The tendency to equate “ignoring a digit” with “treating it as
zero” is widespread in the literature. Anderson and Simester (2003),
for instance, observe that a consumer who looks at a price like $43
and ignores the right-most digit, treats this as $40. This is a common
interpretation in the literature but there seems to be no basis for it. Note
that “ignoring the last digit” could be described more explicitly as “not
looking at the last digit and presuming it to be x.” Once we state it in
this way it is not at all evident why this x should always be zero. It is
much more reasonable to assume that consumers, from their everyday
life experience, have an opinion of what the last digit or digits typically
look like and so when they ignore looking at the last digit or digits they
presume it to be whatever it, typically, is.
What the model illustrates is that assuming this kind of rationality
on the part of consumers can generate behavior and price patterns
that are similar to what would happen if consumers were prone to
certain psychological illusions or even delusions. This is not to deny
that consumers, occasionally, do suffer from illusions.4 But for the
phenomenon being analyzed here there is no need to make such an
assumption.
Interestingly, though the 9-price endings can be explained in these
competing ways, there are subtle differences that emerge in terms of
profits earned by firms and consumer welfare, depending on whether
or not we assume consumers to be rational. All this is illustrated in a
fairly realistic model with many suppliers and oligopolistic behavior.
This paper develops the idea of a “sophisticated Bertrand equilibrium”
and characterizes the class of possible equilibria.
Initial steps toward such a full-fledged model were taken in Basu
(1997). In that model, like here, consumers replaced the last digits of a
price with the average of the last digits that prevailed on the market. But,
4. Indeed, there are certain kinds of evidence that would be hard to explain in terms
of purely rational behavior. Consider the evidence, reported above, where a mail order
catalogue company found that the same good priced at $49 had a higher demand than
when it was priced at $45. The model built here can explain why demands at $49 and $45
would be the same. Therefore, the finding of higher demand at $49 suggests that there is
some additional psychological factor at play here.
There may also be a case for running similar experiments a few more times to check
the robustnessness of the empirical finding.
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unlike here, they did so compulsively. It was not a rational decision to
ignore the last digits. Moreover, there was no strategic behavior among
firms. The exercise was simply one of an optimization problem of a
monopolist. Expanding the analysis to fully rational consumer behavior
and an oligopolistic markets allows us to address larger questions. And
some of the results turn out to be sharply different from what was
obtained in Basu (1997). In the case of a monopoly, it was shown that
the consumer’s tendency to ignore the last digits hurt the monopolist.
On the other hand, in this paper, with fully rational consumers and an
oligopolistic market structure, firms end up benefiting from the fact that
it may be rational for consumers to ignore the last digits of a price. This
is true even if firms are Bertrand competitors.
The paper begins by giving a brief intuitive sketch of the main
argument. The formal model is developed after that, in Sections 3 to 5.
Some of the more speculative discussion is relegated to the last section.
2. Sketch of the Argument
Given the limits of the human brain, it is reasonable to assume that
human beings will not be fully informed. When a person goes through
a supermarket buying goods, is it worthwhile for him to study and take
in the price information of each product in full? It is not evident that the
answer to this will be yes, contrary to what early textbook models of
economics suggested. Indeed, it may not be rational to take in so much
information.5 If, for instance, she looked only at the dollar part of the
prices and took her purchase decisions based on that, she would make
a few wrong decisions, true, but the time saved by using this strategy
may be well worth that little loss. I shall later model the circumstances
where such time saving is worthwhile.
Once consumers begin to behave this way, a Bertrand firm may not
find it worthwhile to undercut other firms by a small amount because
this may go unnoticed by the consumers. If this happens, then the price
cut would not lead to a higher demand and therefore would not be
worthwhile. This could result in an equilibrium where, despite Bertrand
competition, firms earn positive profits. One implication of this model
(or, more accurately, of possible extentions of this model) is that 9-ending
prices are less likely to occur in wholesale markets, where the buyer, by
5. Anderson and Simester (2003a) report a study (by P. Dickson and A. Sawyer) in
which, as shoppers placed items in carts, researchers asked them the prices of what they
had just chosen to buy. Less than half the shoppers gave an accurate price. Buying without
full cognizance of price may at first sight seem irrational. But given our brain’s limited
capacity and the enormous amount of information we are required to process it is not
unreasonable (or even irrational) for us to use simple rules of thumb instead of fully
informed, detailed decision procedures (see Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Todd, 2001;
Todd and Gigerenzer, 2003).
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virtue of the fact that she makes large purchases, finds it rational to be
sensitive to small price changes.
Just as this paper models the consumer’s decision concerning
how much information to collect, it is in principle possible to analyze
how much information firms should collect about consumers. This
question, however, is typically ignored in the theoretical literature (for
an exception, see Lui and Serfes, 2004) and I do the same here. But it
is noteworthy that in this age of information technology it is possible
for firms to collect information easily about more and more refined
partitions of consumers and to use this for discriminatory pricing.
3. Basic Concepts and Notation
Because formal, quantitative analysis of this problem is relatively new,
it is useful to develop some algebra specifically suited to this kind of
study.
In this paper, I shall be concerned with prices that treat a cent as
an indivisable unit. Hence, a price is always expressed up to two places
after the decimal, that is, by numbers like 1.50 or 19.95. Let P be the
collection of all such nonnegative numbers. For every p  P it will at
times be useful to write it as (d, c), where d is the “dollar part” of p and
c is the “cent part” of p. Let φ be a function, on domain P, such that, for
every p  P, φ(p) = (d, c), as defined above. I shall at times write φ(p) =
(d(p), c(p)). Hence, d(12.95) = 12 and c(12.95) = 95. Let ψ be the inverse
of φ. That is, ψ(φ(p)) = p, for all p  P. Therefore, ψ(12, 95) = 12.95.
We shall be concerned, in this paper, with an industry where the
aggregate demand function for the good in question is given by
x = x(p), (1)
for all p  P. And it is assumed that, if p, p′  P such that p > p′, then
x(p) < x(p′).
This industry has n identical firms. Each firm’s per unit cost of
production is given by k  P. For the problem to be nontrivial, I will
assume that x(k + 1) > 0. I shall, on occasions, refer to the marginal cost
as (d(k), c(k)), where (d(k), c(k)) = φ(k).
4. Rational ‘Irrationality’ of the Consumer
While it is true that traditional economic theory was wrong (as the new
“behavioral economics” reminds us) in its assumption that consumers
are always rational, it is also possible to err on the other side by treating
every seemingly irrational behavior as irrational behavior. Consider, for
instance, the fact that human beings make so many decisions without
seriously weighing the pros and cons of the alternatives. Once we
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recognize that the act of weighing the pros and cons of a decision is
itself costly in terms of time and the use of our limited brain capacity, it
may make good sense to leave some decisions to gut feeling, reflexive
action, or simply picking the default option. These ‘irrational’ actions
may, in other words, be rational at a more fundamental level (Basu, 1988,
1992, Section 12.4).
There is a large literature in psychology that illustrates how human
beings often use simple rules of thumb to make decisions, instead of
collecting all relevant information and then making decisions; and how
these “fast and frugal” rules may in fact turn out to be reasonable
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). If, for
instance, people were given pairs of cities and asked which of each pair
had the higher population and people named the city they were more
familiar with, Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999) showed that they would
be right significantly more often than if they chose the answer at random.
Given that the collection of information can be costly in terms of time
and money, for certain purposes the use of this heuristic may be the
rational course. It is this general idea that I shall now use in the context
of consumer decisionmaking concerning what to buy.
Consider a consumer in a large grocery store doing her week’s
shopping. She can stand in front of each competing brand, study the
price fully, let that information sink in, and then make a purchase.
In this way, her purchase will be just right, given her needs, but she
will end up having spent more time in the store than she would if
she were prepared to make mistakes. If time is valuable it may be
rational for her not to dwell too long on taking in every good’s price
information. Now, if a person is keen on economizing on the acquisition
of information concerning some digits, it obviously makes sense to start
with the right-most digits. When we are thinking of small purchases,
for instance, in a grocery store, this will typically refer to the cents
part of the price. (For larger purchases, for instance, in buying a car
it may be the last one or two dollar digits that one ignores—see also
note 10.)
Let us formalize this obvious observation as follows. In making
a purchase, the consumer can go about it in two ways. First, she could
look at only the dollar part of the price and assume that the cent part
of the price is whatever is the average cent parts of prices of all goods
sold in this market and then decide which shop to buy from (picking
randomly from among those that seem to charge the lowest price) and
how much to purchase. Let us call this action A. Second, she could take
in the price information of all offers fully; and then decide which shop to
buy from (again randomizing over shops that charge the lowest price)
and how much to buy. I shall call this action B.
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Assume that the latter action entails a (brain capacity or time) cost
of b(>0) whereas the former is costless.6 In other words, I am assuming
that we have a sense of the average of the cent parts of prices of all goods
that are offered in the market. This is the kind of information we acquire
automatically, and costlessly, in the act of going through life.
In this model we will consider only one good, which is sold by n
producers—a typical oligopoly model. In other words, there will be n
prices being offered in the market. The producer’s (or seller’s) behavior
will be modeled in the next section. Let me describe a typical consumer’s
behavior here.
The consumer’s utility function is given by u = u(x, M), where x
is the amount of the good consumed and M the amount of money left
with the consumer after the purchase of the good. If the price of the
good at which he purchases the product is p and her income is y, then
u = u(x, y − px). This is a semiindirect utility function. Since y will be
taken to be fixed throughout, we will suppress it and write the semi-
indirect utility function as
v = v(x, p) ≡ u(x, y − px). (2)
Note that the consumers’ demand function, described above by
(1), is easily derived from this. In particular, x(p) = m[arg maxxv(x, p)],
where m is the number of (identical) consumers.
To describe a consumer’s cognition problem, it is convenient to, at
times, abuse notation a little and write φ(p) in place of p in (1) and (2).
That is, I shall, on occasion, write the v(·)-function as v(x, (d, c)) and the
demand function as x(d, c), where (d, c) = φ(p). In other words, v(x, (d, c))
and x(d, c) refer to v(x, ψ(d, c)) and x(ψ(d, c)).
Suppose the prices prevailing in the market are given by {(di, ci)}iS,
where S is the set of sellers, with #S = n. Anticipating what will turn
out to be true in equilibrium, let me make the harmless assumption
that the dollar part of all prices are the same. That is, di ≡ d, for all i  S.
Hence, the vector of prices that the consumer confronts may be written
as {(d, ci)}iS.
Suppose the consumer opts for action B. Then her total utility is
given by
vB = max
iS
v(x(d, ci ), (d, ci )) − b.
If, on the other hand, she goes for action A, then her utility is given by
vA = E
i
v(x(d, c¯), (d, ci )),
where c¯ = (c1 + · · · + cn)/n, and Ei is the expectations operator.
6. It would be analytically equivalent (though the algebra would get more compli-
cated) if it was assumed that the brain use or time cost of action B was t and the brain use
or time cost associated with action A was t + b.
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The consumer will choose action A if and only if vA > vB.
Hence, a consumer who ignores price information about the cent
part of the price incurs two kinds of cost. He may fail to purchase from
the seller offering the lowest price and the amount she consumes may
be different from what would be optimal for the price that she actually
pays.
This model of consumer cognition can be made more sophisti-
cated in many different ways. First note that any decision problem
that involves costly evaluation, as in this exercise (recall b > 0), has
an infinite regress problem. If making an evaluated choice between
two alternatives, X and Y, involves a cost, then making an evaluated
choice between whether to make an evaluated choice between X and
Y or to choose at random between them will, presumably, involve
some cost; and so on.7 Second, if the consumer knows the distribution
of c′s on the market but not the c facing her, it is not typically the
case that she will use the average value of c to decide how much to
buy. And even if she did not know the distribution of c′s but merely
knew the value of the expectation of the c′s, it is not obvious that
she should use exactly the expectation to decide how much of the
good to consume. The above model, in these kinds of cases, is best
thought of as a reasonable approximation of precisely rational behavior.
Morever, the main results of this paper (this will be obvious later) will
not hinge on these refinements. The result will be invariant to many
different formulations of consumer decisionmaking under limited brain
capacity.
Fortunately, we do not need to model the full range of consumer
behavior, when decisionmaking is costly. For the purpose of the present
paper it is enough to assume that if the cent parts of all prices prevailing
in the market are the same, then EvA > EvB, that is, the consumer will
choose action A. The rationale behind this assumption is not hard to
see. If the cent part of every price on the market is c¯, then it is not
unreasonable to assume that the consumer knows (from everyday life)
that the cent part of a randomly selected good will almost certainly be c¯.
Hence EvA  EvB + b. For a person placing a large order (for example,
agreeing to a long-distance phone price for the next 2 years, or buying
on the wholesale market) this may not be a realistic assumption since the
possibility (even if imagined) of a small error may make the person take
full cognizance of the price. But for everyday retail shopping it seems
fine; and in the present paper I shall make use of this assumption.
7. A formal expression of this infinite regress problem and the demonstration of its
essential unsolvability was discussed in Basu (1980).
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5. Sophisticated Bertrand Oligopoly
The game that will be considered here is one where the n firms and the m
consumers make their decisions simultaneously. Each firm i announces
its price (di, ci) and each consumer j chooses Xj  {A, B}. Let us call this
game “the sophisticated Bertrand Oligopoly.”
An n-tuple of choices by the firms, ((d1, c1), . . . , (dn, cn)) ≡ 〈d, c〉,
will be called a sophisticated Bertrand equilibrium if there exists X =
{X1, . . . , Xm} , where Xj  {A, B}, such that (〈d, c〉, X) is a Nash equilibrium
of the sophisticated Bertrand oligopoly.
In conducting our analysis it is useful to distinguish between
two kinds of (sophisticated Bertrand) equilibria. I shall say that an
equilibrium is “symmetric” if all identical agents behave in the same
way in equilibrium. Hence, in this model a “symmetric equilibrium” is
a sophisticated Bertrand equilibrium in which all consumers make the
same choice and all firms set the same price. A sophisticated Bertrand
equilibrium that is not symmetric is called an “asymmetric equilibrium.”
Recall that each firm’s marginal cost of production is given by
(d(k), c(k)). The main result of this paper is that every firm charging a
price of (d(k), 99) is always a sophisticated Bertrand equilibrium. And
every firm charging a price of (d(k) + 1, 99) could be a sophisticated
Bertrand equilibrium, depending on the parameters of the model. No
other price can occur in a symmetric equilibrium. No price below
(d(k), 99) and no price above (d(k) + 1, 99) can ever be a sophisticated
Bertrand equilibrium. In some markets there may exist an asymmetric
equilibrium in which two prices prevail, one ending in 99 and another
with a non-99 ending.
Before proving the result, let me illustrate it geometrically. Figure 1
shows the aggregate demand curve that the industry faces and each
firm’s marginal cost curve (as depicted by the horizontal line through
point E). Because prices cannot be announced in units smaller than a
cent, not all points on the demand curve, AB, are available but only a
‘grid’ of points, one cent apart. Some of these are illustrated by the round
nodules marked on the line AB, for instance, points E, F, G, H, and
some more unlabeled points. Let us initially consider only symmetric
equilibria.
If this were standard model, with consumers always fully cog-
nizant of the prices being charged, the oligopoly would have exactly
two possible (Bertrand) equilibrium points, at F and at E. That is, there
is one Bertrand equilibrium where everybody charges the marginal cost
(d(k), c(k)) and another Bertrand equilibrium where everybody charges
one cent more than the marginal cost. In other words firms will earn
zero profit or virtually zero profit.
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FIGURE 1. F DEPICTS A POINT ONE CENT ABOVE E. G,
H AND J DEPICT POINTS ONE CENT BELOW RESPECTIVELY,
(d(k) + 1, 0), (d(k) + 2, 0) AND (d(k) + 3, 0). (d(k), c(k)) AND E LIE ON
THE SAME HORIZONTAL LINE
In a sophisticated Bertrand oligopoly that the present paper is
concerned with, F and E cannot be equilibrium points. Instead, point G
is always an equilibrium, and point H may be an equilibrium.
To prove this, consider the case where all n firms charge the price
(d(k), 99), that is, the price associated with point G and the consumer
chooses action A (i.e., ignores the actual cent information). If a firm
charges a higher price, the dollar amount charged by this firm will be
higher. Hence, all consumers will notice the higher price and refuse to
buy from this firm, which will therefore earn zero. If the firm charges a
lower price (but one that is at least as large as (d(k), c(k)) no consumer
will realize this. So the demand faced by this firm will be as before;
and therefore its profit will be lesser.8 Because all firms charge the
same price, the consumer has nothing to gain by evaluating each price
8. It may seem, at first sight, that even one firm lowering the price could have an affect
on consumer demand (however small) through its effect on the average cent part of the
price. But that is not so in a sophisticated Bertrand equilibrium where firms choose prices
and consumers choose between being types A and B simultaneously. Once consumers
choose A, they are focused on the existing average cent part. Unilateral deviations by
firms have no effect on these consumers.
It is possible to alter the equilibrium definition so that consumers choosing A, use the
average cent part post deviation. In that case a unilateral deviation by a firm could affect
demand (unless n was assumed to be sufficiently large).
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information. In other words, she is better off choosing strategy A instead
of B. Hence, no one benefits from a unilateral deviation, and so G depicts
a sophisticated Bertrand equilibrium.9
Now, it will be shown that point H can, under some condi-
tions, be an equilibrium. H depicts the price (d(k) + 1, 99). Suppose all
firms charge the price at H, that is, (d(k) + 1, 99), and every consumer
chooses action A. Then each firm earns a profit of [(d(k) + 1, 99) −
(d(k), c(k))]x((d(k) + 1, 99))/n, since (d(k), c(k))  [(d(k), 0), (d(k) + 1, 0)).
By the same logic as in the above paragraph no firm will find it
worthwhile deviating to a higher price or to a lower price that is, at
the same time, greater than or equal to (d(k) + 1, 0). So now consider a
firm deviating to price (d(k), 99), that is, to point G. This firm’s profit
will be equal to [(d(k), 99) − (d(k), c(k))]x((d(k), 99)). This is because a
change in the dollar part of the price is noticed by all consumers. If
(d(k), 99) = (d(k), c(k)), then clearly such a deviation is not worthwhile.
But even if (d(k), 99) > (d(k), c(k)), it is obvious that if n is small and
(d(k), c(k)) is close to (d(k), 99), then it will not pay for any single firm to
deviate to (d(k), 99). And for the consumer a deviation from strategy A
is not worthwhile for the same reason as before.
This establishes that for certain parameters H can be an
equilibrium.
It will now be shown that there are no other (symmetric) equilibria
in this game. Thus if G and E are distinct points (i.e., c(k) < 99), then
all firms charging the price depicted by E cannot be an equilibrium.
Similarly for F.
To prove this, first note that in no symmetric Nash equilibrium
will the consumers choose action B. If the consumers prefer action B,
it must be the case that there are firms i and j which charge different
prices and manage to sell. But if the consumers choose action B, then
they are fully cognizant of prices and so no one will buy from the firm
charging a higher price. This is a contradiction, which establishes that
all consumers will choose action A in a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
If all consumers choose action A, then all firms will choose prices
that end in 99. Hence, only prices like G and H (the first and second
points, above the marginal cost where the price ends in 9) can qualify.
We have already shown that G is always an equilibrium and H may be
an equilibrium. The proof is completed by showing that no price above
H can be an equilibrium.
Without loss of generality, consider the next price above H, where
the price ends in 99. This is shown by point J. If all firms charge this
price, each firm will earn a profit of
9. The figure in this paper is drawn for the case where c(k) < 99. If c(k) = 99 , it is easy
to see that each firm charging a price of (d(k), 99) is a sophisticated Bertrand equilibrium.
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P1 ≡ [(d(k) + 2, 99) − (d(k), c(k))] x((d(k) + 2, 99))n
= 2 x((d(k) + 2, 99))
n
+ [(d(k), 99) − (d(k), c(k))] x((d(k) + 2, 99))
n
.
If one firm deviates to price (d(k) + 1, 99), then such a firm will
earn a profit of
P2 ≡ [(d(k) + 1, 99) − (d(k), c(k))]x((d(k) + 1, 99))
= x((d(k) + 1, 99)) + [(d(k), 99) − (d(k), c(k))]x((d(k) + 1, 99)).
Because n ≥ 2 and x((d(k) + 2, 99)) < x((d(k) + 1, 99)), it follows that
x((d(k) + 1, 99)) > 2x((d(k) + 2,99))n . It is therefore obvious that P2 > P1.
Hence, J cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. By a similar proof we
can establish that for no t ≥ 3 can each firm charging (d(k) + t, 99) be an
equilibrium.
This completes the proof of our main result for the symmetric case.
In this oligopolistic market there could be some asymmetric
(sophisticated Bertrand) equilibria as well. But these will always be-
long to the following class. There will exist two prices (d(k), 99) and
(d(k), c(k) + 1), or (d(k) + 1, 99) and (d(k) + 1, 0), and each firm will
announce one of the two prices. Some consumers will choose action
B (I shall call them discerning consumers since they act discern-
ingly in equilibrium.) and others will choose action A. This is an
unlikely and nongeneric equilibrium and I present it here for reasons of
completeness.
To see this, consider a case where some consumers choose to
be discerning and some nondiscerning. It is first easy to see that all
firms will charge prices that are identical in the dollar parts. If not,
all consumers—the discerning and the nondiscerning—will ignore the
firms charging a higher dollar price. It is easy to see (using the same
kind of reasoning as before) that prices cannot be above (d(k) + 1, 99).
Hence, all firms will charge a price with the dollar part equal to d(k) or
they will all set the dollar part equal to d(k) + 1.
Without loss of generality, let me focus on the d(k)-case. That is,
it will be shown that there could be an equilibrium where two prices
prevail: (d(k), 99) and (d(k), c(k) + 1). Suppose there are more than two
prices prevailing. In that case, there exist two firms charging prices
(d(k), a) and (d(k), b) where a < b < 99. Hence, the only consumers who
go to the firm charging price (d(k), b) will be the nondiscerning ones. In
that case a firm charging (d(k), b) could raise price to (d(k), 99) without
losing customers. This is a contradiction.
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Therefore, if there is an asymmetric equilibrium, there will exist
two prices: (d(k), 99) and (d(k), c(k) + 1). To see that there can be such an
equilibrium, assume that there exists ψ∗  (0, 1) such that if a fraction ψ∗
of firms charge (d(k), 99) and fraction (1 − ψ∗) charge (d(k), c(k) + 1), then
consumers are indifferent between actions A and B. For future discussion
I shall refer to this as the “indifference axiom.” If no such ψ∗ exists, that
is, the indifference axiom is invalid, then the oligopoly will not have
any asymmetric equilibrium. Let us consider here the interesting case
where the indifference axiom holds; and let the ψ∗ referred to below be
precisely these values.
It will now be shown that, if there exists a number φ∗  (0, 1), such
that if a fraction φ∗ of consumers choose A and a fraction 1 − φ∗ choose B,
then firms are indifferent between charging (d(k), 99) and (d(k), c(k) + 1),
and we do have an equilibrium in which some firms set price equal to
(d(k), 99) and some firms set price at (d(k), c(k) + 1).
To see this consider φ to be a fraction and suppose mφ consumers
choose action A. All others choose action B. Using x to denote c(k) + 1,
let π¯99 and π¯x be the total profits earned by all firms charging a price of,
respectively, (d(k), 99) and (d(k), x),
π¯99 = mψ∗φ(99 − c(k)),
π¯x = m(1 − ψ∗φ)(x − c(k)).
To understand this note that firms charging (d(k), 99) will only get
consumers who choose action A. There are mφ consumers who choose
this action. Because these consumers choose among firms randomly, a
fraction ψ∗ of these consumers go to the firms charging (d(k), 99) since
ψ∗ is the fraction of firms charging this price. From each consumer, such
a firm earns a profit of 99 − c(k). This explains the value of π¯99. π¯x is
derived in the same way by simply noting that all other consumers (i.e.,
m − mψ∗φ of them) go to firms charging (d(k), x).
Let π99 and πx be the profits earned by each firm charging, respec-
tively, a price of (d(k), 99) and (d(k), x). Hence,
π99 = mψ
∗φ(99 − c(k))
nψ∗
= mφ(99 − c(k))
n
,
πx = m(1 − ψ
∗φ)(x − c(k))
n(1 − ψ∗) .
Let φ∗  (0, 1) be the value of φ, which makes π99 = πx. That is,
π99 = mφ
∗(99 − c(k))
n
= m(1 − ψ
∗φ∗)(x − c(k))
n(1 − ψ∗) = πx.
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If mφ∗ consumers choose action A and nψ∗ firms set price equal to
(d(k), 99) we have an equilibrium. Consumers, we already know by the
indifference axiom, are indifferent between A and B. Therefore none of
them has an incentive to deviate. Observe next that π99 does not depend
on ψ and that
πx(ψ) ≡ m(1 − ψφ
∗)(x − c(k))
n(1 − ψ) ,
is an increasing function of ψ . Hence, starting with nψ∗ firms choosing
(d(k), 99), if one more firm switches to (d(k), x) then this firm’s profit will
decline, since π99 = πx(ψ∗) and π99 > πx(ψ), for all ψ < ψ∗. And, if a
firm charging (d(k), x) switches to charging (d(k), 99) it will get the same
profit as before and if it switches to (d(k), c(k)), it will earn zero. Hence,
what we have is a Nash equilibrium or, equivalently, a sophisticated
Bertrand equilibrium of an oligopoly.
To sum up, the model predicts that prices will generally end in
nines but in some markets there will be two modal price endings, one of
which will invariably be 9. It is interesting to note that the asymmetric
equilibrium in which the non-9 ending occurs would exist only if
the indifference axiom holds. It is arguable that for products where
people buy large amounts of some commodity or agree to a per unit
price and then buy the commodity or service over a long period of time
the indifference axiom is less likely to be satisfied. In such cases a small
price difference translates into a large loss or gain for the buyer and
hence consumers are more likely to take cognizance of the exact price.
Therefore, for these kinds of goods multiple prices are less likely to occur
in the same market.
6. Implications and Extensions
The model constructed in this paper explains why we see such
widespread prevalence of prices that end in 99 cents. Of course, for
more valuable goods where prices do not go into cents, what this model
implies is that the last nonzero digit of the price will be a 9. Thus a
car could have a price of $15,690 and a holiday in the Bahamas may
command a price of $899.10 Conversely, for goods that are very cheap,
10. There is indeed an open question about how far to the right the nines go. Why
is the car not priced at $15,699.99 and why does the Bahamas vacation not cost $899.99?
The formal result that we have discussed here is that if we think of every number as
having an endless sequence of digits after the decimal point, then the last nonzero digit
will tend to be 9. What we do not have is a theory of where the nines stop and the zeros
take over. At an informal level it is arguable that a car maker who sets a price at $15,699.99
will frighten away customers by appearing extortionate. (“Would she not also have saved
money by compromising on the quality of the break?” the customer may wonder.) But
this is a separate problem that deserves to be investigated separately.
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for instance, less than a dollar, a similar argument can be used to show
that only the last digit will be 9, for example, a candy for 49 cents.
Unlike in the model of monopoly discussed in Basu (1997), we find
that firms benefit from this phenomenon of pricing in the nines. This
enables (sophisticated) Bertrand oligopolists to sustain a price above
the marginal cost (and even above the prices that could prevail in the
standard Bertrand oligopoly model with an exogenously fixed smallest
unit of change). Also, unlike in a monopoly, some non-9 endings are
now possible in equilibrium.
The non-9 endings are, however, nongeneric outcomes in the
model. Some natural extensions of the above model can, however,
explain why 9 endings, though pervasive, are not as widespread as
this model suggests. Note that in this model the consumer forms an
expectation about the cent part of the price on the basis of the average
cent part of all prices for the same good. An alternative model could
go as follows. Suppose there are t products and for each product there
are n firms producing it. Assume that consumers ignore looking at the
cent part of the price when buying a good, just as in the above model,
but assume the cent part to be whatever is the average cent part for all
goods in all markets.
If this is how people form their expectations, then we can get some
results that do not occur in the above model. Suppose that for product
i′s market all n firms choose the cent part of the price to be ci. And
suppose for some i, j, ci 	= cj. This could lead all consumers to be of type
B. That being so we could have an equilibrium in which ci 	= cj persists.
Hence, non-9 price endings could be prevalent. However, in the same
model we could have another equilibrium where ci = 99, for all i, and all
consumers choose to be of type A. Hence, clearly we can have multiple
equilibria in such a model.
Because as yet we do not have enough empirical data to know
exactly how consumers form expectations about the cent parts or the
last digits of a price, it is important to take both the above kinds of
assumptions seriously.
Another natural way to extend the model is to suppose that, if
a person is planning a very large purchase, he takes cognizance of
the exact per unit price of the product since even a tiny difference in
per unit price could make a big difference to his cost. While I have
not modeled this formally here, it is reasonable to expect that in such
situations the indifference axiom discussed above will be violated and
so we will invariably see only one price for each good. If we go a
step further and introduce the idea of “cautious behavior” on the part
of consumers, which is defined behavior that takes into account the
possibility of “trembles” in prices whether or not there exists any actual
price variability in the market, then it is likely that the dominance of
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the 9 endings will break down. For goods, where the consumer places
large orders (i.e., several multiples of the unit) on the basis of a per unit
price, there will be a unique price but there will be no special reason for
this to have a 9 ending. Therefore, for goods like cement, house paint,
phone calls, and long-term lawn-mowing contracts we will be less likely
to see 9-price endings. By the same kind of reasoning we would expect
to see a wider use of prices ending in 9 in the retail market, where small
quantities of goods are purchased, or in the market for perishable goods,
as opposed to, for instance, the wholesale market.
In general, this paper suggests that, instead of assuming consumer
irrationality and consumer psychological delusion, if we simply recog-
nized that consumers have limited time for decisionmaking and limited
brain capacity and they act rationally subject to these limitations, then
we can get results that elude the standard literature on industrial pricing
and mimic some of the results that behavioral economics derives only
by assuming consumer irrationality.
This is not to suggest that consumers are never irrational but
simply that we must not be too hasty in jumping to the conclusion of
irrationality either. Many interesting, nonstandard results and testable
propositions can be derived from models that deviate from the textbook
neo-classical model, while retaining the precept of rationality.
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